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A MODEST RELATIVISM
Leslie Griffin *
"ANJo ends can be better than the means of their achievement.
This phrase, quoted from Professor Linde's 1975 Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise Lecture, is distinctive and restrained. It is
distinctive in contrast to the usual "the end does not justify the
means." It is restrained in its rejection of unattainable ends sought
by ever-inadequate means. It expresses the professor's preference
for 'the morality of process"' over the "perfection of unique
principles of justice. 2 After 1975, Justice Linde demonstrated his
distinctive and restrained jurisprudence on the Oregon Supreme
Court.
When I met him in 1991, Justice Linde was again Professor
Linde, teaching constitutional law at Stanford Law School. He
knew of my pre-law school education in moral philosophy and
religion, and recognized that I often looked at law from the
perspective of moral theory. Occasionally he expressed skepticism
about comprehensive theories of morality and their relevance for
the law, and I worried about law without morals.
This journal celebrates Justice Linde's distinctive contributions to
state constitutional commentary. I appreciate the corresponding
insights on morality and law that arise from the specifics of the
states. Justice Linde reminds us, for example, that "a state court
has reason for caution in describing even strongly held values as
moral or social absolutes .... [A] modest relativism in such matters
is forced upon us by the federal system itself'3 (in which fifty states
disagree about their values). State courts learn much of their
"modest relativism" from the detailed work of "ordinary law, 4 of
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law.
Hans A. Linde, Due Process olLawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 255 (1976).
2 Id. (quoting Alexander M. Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, COMMENTARY, Jan.
1974, at 25).
' Hans A. Linde, EPluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165,
192 (1984) (emphasis added).
4 Id. at 191.
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marriage and death and debt. So may philosophers learn from this
Justice the merits of a restrained inductive reasoning based on the
details of ordinary life.
The moral relativism is modest and not absolute, a lesson that is
reinforced by Justice Linde's analysis of state initiatives. Moral
passions may drive majorities to impose their values on minorities
through the initiative process. In such circumstances law-the
guarantee of a republican form of government-restrains the
popular emotions and mandates "processes that maximize[ I careful
deliberation and minimize[ ], even though [they] cannot eliminate,
the influence of- 'passion' and sectarian 'factions."'5 Law keeps
morality modest.
Justice Linde taught at Stanford during the Persian Gulf War.
While others debated the just war principles, he insisted that the
effects of war on domestic law not be neglected. I learned from his
research projects how good lawyers and good judges reason. A good
judge knows that a case "if possible should remain [ ] a case of
ordinary administrative and statutory law before becoming a
constitutional case. 6  This good Justice reminded federal courts
that a case if possible should remain a case of statutory or
constitutional interpretation before becoming a moral case. This
good Professor teaches students, philosophers, and citizens that
every moral case should not become law.
' Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government" The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 38 (1993).
6 Cooper v. Eugene School Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 301 (Or. 1986).
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